Leaderboard
728x15
Showing posts with label Integrated Delivery Systems. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Integrated Delivery Systems. Show all posts

The Good and the Bad of Risk-Based Contracting: Large Integrated Groups Are Adapting Another Form of Managed Care with Limited Consumer Choice and Restricted Networks?


"Should I refer out of network?"
What is the secret health reform sauce of those famous large integrated medical groups?  Come to think of it, do they even have secret sauce?

To better understand the apparent success of household names like Dean, Geisinger, Group Health, and Mayo, Rob Mechanic and Darren Zinner surveyed and then interviewed the CEO or the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) of 21 famous large provider groups to understand their operational approach to risk based contracting.
 
That's important because emerging payment public and private insurer reform will include "bundled payments," upside risk-sharing and forms of capitation.  In these kinds of arrangements, the financial "risk" from high overhead, overutilization or excess costs will be the provider groups' problem, not the insurers'.

In other words, if ACO wannabes want to succeed when it comes to risk-based contracting, they may learn about the good and the bad of the large integrated group business model.

The authors discovered that about half of these groups had less than a third of their income coming from risk-based contracting (RBC).  In these ten groups, an average 88% of income was fee-for-service.

The other half (eleven) had more than a third of their income coming from risk based contracting.  In these groups, 71% of income was risk-based.

The authors then compared the approaches of the "low" risk and "high" risk groups.

While Disease Management Care Blog readers will be very familiar with elements making up the "good" secret sauce of risk-based contracting, they may be surprised at the reemergence of two bad downsides.

The good ingredients included 1) blunted physician financial incentives to "churn" patient visits, 2) a slight but significant increased emphasis on using quality measures to reward physicians and 3) a significant investment in data warehousing, analytics, patient registries and point-of-care patient-tracking.

In particular:

9 out of 10 low risk contracting groups based the "majority" of physician income on productivity. In contrast, five of the capitated groups paid 80% of their PCPs with a salary, while the other half paid 80% of income based on productivity

"Quality" measures drove a small percent of PCP income in both groups, though it was higher in the capitated groups (5% vs. 12%)

85% of all groups had invested in electronic health records; 100% of the capitated groups had invested in data warehouses with analytic software and two thirds had patient registries.  Only one of the FFS groups had those capabilities. While both types of groups had a low rate of "patient engagement" programs, the high risk groups were more likely to have care management programs in place. 

And the bad? 

The DMCB was surprised to read that the risk-based groups were far more likely to have mechanisms in place to limit their patients' out of network utilization (90 vs. 20%) and 2/3 vs. 1/3 had preferred relationships with "efficient" hospitals and providers.  In other words, these role-model and state-of-the-art organizations could be limiting patient choice and economically credentialing their provider groups.

Much depends on the details.  Insurers have probably not forgotten the abuses and resulting backlash that arose from unfettered capitation.  Good risk contracting typically includes quality and satisfaction metrics side by side with utilization targets and specifically prohibits windfall profits. Modern consumer protections at the state and federal oversight level are also far more rigorous.

That being said, the DMCB points out that it's no accident that this study shows risk-based contracting is associated with limits on choice and restricted networks.  We may not call it "managed care," but in many respects it is.

Why The Tipping Point for Health System Consolidation May Be Closer Than We Realize: Lessons from Airline Mergers

Ready for take off
From time to time, the Disease Management Care Blog and other pundits turn to the airline industry draw lessons on the evolution of health care.  Integrated human-computer systems, safety check-lists, website-based Expedia-like price transparency, teaming and other such notions have infiltrated health policy PowerPoint presentations worse than Doritos bags in Seattle Hempfest crowd.

While the DMCB was mulling another lesson about the divide between coach (what vanilla insurance could turn out to be) versus business/first class (concierge-style direct pay), along came this interesting Wall Street Journal article by airline industry bad boy Robert Crandall about the American Airlines - US Airways merger.  He argues 1) mergers that lead to bigger are better (no surprise there) and 2) if some airlines are allowed to go big, the only way for others to compete is to go bigger also.

That latter argument is important, and may also hold lessons for health care. 

Mr. Crandall argues that once the furies are released and one or two regionally dominant service providers are allowed to populate the marketplace, smaller competitors are at a disadvantage.  As a result, they have no choice but to also seek alliances and mergers.  How well government reconciles consumer interests and business profitability will remain an open question involving lawyers, bureaucrats and politicians.

Ditto regional health care systems, accountable care organizations and integrated provider organizations. 

Once one of these behemoths is unleashed in a city or corner of a state, smaller neighboring provider systems will naturally circle the wagons and seek permission to consolidate so that, just like the airlines, they can compete. They make a good argument, because without the size, they could go bankrupt. 

As health reform continues, geographically large systems that can access capital, achieve economies of scale, become accountable and take insurance risk will grow in number and complexity. That will only fuel the further consolidation of small local hospitals and smaller physician practices.

In other words, the lesson from the airlines may be that that "tipping point" for nationwide health system consolidation may be much closer than we realize.

Image from Wikipedia

Wishful Ideology About Integrated Delivery Systems

Kaiser Health News has posted a telling interview with former White House health adviser Ezekiel Emanuel MD. In it, Dr. Emanuel repeats a bold prediction about the end of health insurance companies:

Question: You also predict the end of insurance companies as we know them. Rather than continuing to function as the middleman between employers and health care providers, you say insurers may themselves contract with networks of doctors and hospitals, morphing into integrated health care delivery systems. But a one-stop shop isn’t always good for consumers. Networks are restrictive, and at least now, if your insurer turns you down for treatment, your doctor may go to bat for you.

Answer: I don't agree with you. In general, integrated systems do a pretty good job compared to lots of other ways care could be delivered. We like the adversarial system. We believe that’s the best. On the other hand, with integrated networks you can have better coordination of care. And people are mildly sticky. Once you pick an insurance network, you tend to stick with it. That's also good for the insurer. If someone selected you, year in and year out you'll be with them. That changes the dynamic. And to the extent people are long-term keepers, that’s going to be a better arrangement.

"Better arrangement?" The Population Health Blog isn't so sure:

1. As pointed out at the start of the interview, health insurance has been around for more than 200 years. Its staying power is testimony to the enduring value proposition of pooling and monetizing risk. We discard that our peril.

2. Assuming "integrated systems" will competently manage that risk is a stretch.

3. Part of competently managing that risk - even for provider groups - is utilization review.  While the interviewer unflatteringly portrays that as "your insurer turns you down for treatment," the truth is far more complicated mix of advantages and disadvantages that have been heavily regulated (an example here) for decades.

4. Can enlightened "coordination of care" make utilization review unnecessary?  The luxury of Dr. Emanuel's anti-health insurer ideology makes it easy for him to say yes.  So far, inconvenient facts about the ACO pilot program suggest a different story.

5. Plus, can restrictive networks also make utilization review unnecessary?  It remains to be seen whether consumers will appreciate the irony that this invention of managed care is now being embraced by Dr. Emanuel and other progressives, or agree that significant limits on provider choice will be a "better arrangement."

6. Last but not least, doctors like the PHB have been trained and acculturated to put the individual patient's interests before any other consideration, including the success of an integrated delivery system. Unable to say no, our loyalty will translate to the usual specialist referrals, sophisticated testing, the latest technology and the priciest drugs.  Culture trumps everything.

Like it says, the PHB isn't too sure.  Maybe with the right combination of patient incentives, decision support, shared decision making, risk stratification and tailored population health, integrated systems will ultimately prevail.  Time will tell.

Give credit, however, to Dr. Emanuel for being consistent over the last two years.

The same is true for the PHB.  Based on the emerging facts on the ground, the PHB still thinks the odds remain against Dr. Emanuel.

And the offer of a $1000 bet still stands.

What GM's Ignition Switch Travails Can Teach About Concentration of Risk: Implications for Large Integrated Delivery Systems

CEO Barra not having a
good day at a Congressional hearing
Today, the motoring Population Health Blog used its C-SPAN enabled car radio to listen in on the U.S. House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee's grilling of General Motor's CEO Mary Barra.  As the PHB understands it, GM allowed millions of its cars to stay on the road despite awareness among some of its executives of a faulty ignition switch that failed to "meet specifications."  It was deployed in seven GM models for over a decade.

The PHB can assure readers that when it comes to using "gotcha" yes or no questions on a humbled CEO to plumb the meaning of "specifications," Congressional bipartisanship is alive and well.

While GM is completing its internal investigation and the PHB is speculating, it's possible that GM's travails are ultimately the result of concentrated risk.  While standardization across automobile manufacturing is a no-brainer, it all came down to a weeny metal spring's inability to hold a plunger in place. That led to a loss in power in moving cars with a catastrophic failure of steering, brakes and airbags.

Which naturally brings the PHB to health care.

In a recent chat with a well-connected and savvy colleague, it was pointed out that some health leaders are predicting that, in the years to come, health care in the United States will be delivered by a network of dominant regional integrated delivery systems.  Many policymakers naturally welcome the prospect of "postindustrial care" that is replacing a highly variable and unmeasured cottage industry with guideline-driven science and standardized protocols.  Part of that standardization will almost certainly include uniform treatment pathways and medical devices.

The problem? 

Never mind that some guidelines may not work as well as intended.  They can actually cause harm. Medical devices, just like ignition switches, are also not perfect and can lead to (for example) broken pacemaker wires or premature artificial joint failures.  While guideline and device mishaps are infrequent, the rise of "systems" means they're more likely to involve many more people when they inevitably do happen.

That's because these large regional delivery systems will be favoring single processes and products across all patients and all settings.  Instead of a flawed ignition switch in seven models, think of flawed pacemaker in all seven hospitals serving three states.

What's more, it's possible that GM decided that a low rate of failure (ultimately only 31 accidents with 13 fatalities) represented an acceptable cost-risk ratio.  The PHB recalls GM was financially ailing during the period in question; could it have decided that retooling a manufacturing process was too expensive?  If future integrated delivery systems also turn out to be financially stressed, will they likewise be tempted to stick with an old pacemaker or metal joint, despite early indications of problems?

Oh, and if you think it's just a matter of better government oversight, tell that to Acting Administrator of National Highway Traffic Administration, David Friedman .  He was seated next to Ms. Barra and was asked about his decision not to act on switch complaints as far back as 2007.

Risk is unavoidable.  It's just a matter of anticipating it in all it's many forms.  Assuming these big regional systems turn out to have traction, this concentration of risk will be a feature of them. 

The PHB leaves it to its readers to decide if it's worth it.

The End of Power Health Care?

Corporate titans enjoying
the good old days.
While Moses Naim's The End of Power devotes only a few pages to medicine, it's still provocative and worthwhile reading for anyone involved in the delivery of health care.

As the Population Health Blog understands it, the book's central thesis is that traditional "power" is being disrupted by the three modern trends of "more," "mobility" and "mentality."

We live in an unprecedented era of more (relative) widespread wealth, have an astonishing ability to move goods, services, information and ourselves around the globe (mobility) and are far less likely to adopt the cultural and intellectual assumptions and norms of established society (mentality).

Despite the depressing narrative of the "elite 1%," the irony is that governments and corporations have far less ability to command and control the 99%. This has big implications for world affairs, democracy and U.S. power.

Wow.

Big themes like this naturally prompt the excitable Population Health Blog to speculate about the implications of Naim's more-mobility-mentality for health reform in the United States.

It should be no wonder that policymakers, politicians, academics and regulators are promoting a large and concentrated i.e. powerful version of healthcare delivery.  These cognoscenti argue that huge integrated delivery systems, accountable care organizations and regional providers can "rationalize" health care with standardized protocols, less variation, efficient service lines, alignmment of incentives, optimum capital deployment and assumption of insurance risk.

Mr. Naim cautions that the power-play may not succeed. The PHB extrapolates:

1. While pundits can argue whether the Affordable Care Act's insurance options are as good as they should be, we're devoting a lot of wealth toward health care. More individuals have higher levels of resources to put into their care than they've ever had before. And they know it.

2. While that wealth is being tempered by out-of-pocket expenses, network exclusions, service limitations and other trade-offs, consumers still have relatively abundant choices on not only when, but where to see that doctor, have that surgery or take that pill.  By the way, information is not only cheaper (thanks to the internet) but no longer monopolized by the health professions. 

3. Whether it's a one-on-one recommendation to have a procedure or a proposal to build a new hospital wing, gone are the days when a professional expert's opinion was automatically accepted. Stakeholders are demanding evidence, seeking justification, asking for alternatives and are relishing the "gotcha" moments.

Where do these healthcare versions of more-mobility-mentality take us? Greater access to resources means higher expectations. Mobility means consumers will use exercise choice to cross country, state or even national borders to access care when they choose to do so.  And mentality translates into higher levels of individual consumerism.

Instead of protocols with less variation, patients will want the care to be personalized. Service lines will be judged less on efficiency than on local notions of value. Provider incentives based on "outcomes" and "upside risk" will have zero value proposition for their wealthy, mobile and skeptical customers.  Capital won't necessarily flow toward non-performing assets and year-end savings won't materialize just because policymakers wish it so.

Accountable care organizations and integrated delivery systems will still have huge competitive advantages. That being said, their chances competing successly against smaller competitors and access to capital will be increased if

1) their protocols are flexible,

2) variation is not only welcome but warranted,

3) patients have a good reason to choose their service lines,

4) incentives are broadened, and

5) this new and different level of complicated risk is realistically priced.

And that's assuming that the health provider policymakers, politicians, academics, regulators and CEOs realize that they're not quite in charge anymore.
Leaderboard