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Showing posts with label Pay for Performance. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pay for Performance. Show all posts

Three Population Health Management Principles for Reconciling Quality-Based Pay for Performance and the Doctor-Patient Relationship

Writing in the New England Journal, Robert Berenson and Deborah Kay of the Urban Institute say a linchpin of Washington DC's pursuit of quality is a "policy overreach [that] could undermine the quest for higher-value health care."

Yikes.  The Disease Management Care Blog turns to population health management to ponder their unhappiness.

The authors' concern is over Medicare's "Physician Quality Reporting System" or "PQRS."  As the DMCB understands it, PQRS rewards (and penalizes) physicians for outcomes that are calculated from a set of quality "modifiers" that are submitted as part of the Medicare billing statement (an example can be found here).  The amount of money at stake is in the range of 1%-2% of the Medicare reimbursements.

Berensen and Kay point out that while the system has been ramping up over 6 years, 70% of Medicare participating physicians do not submit any modifiers.  In their opinion, that's because:

1) the loss of 1% of any payment is practically meaningless,

2) physicians distrust the metrics and

3) there is a fundamental disconnect between the modifiers and the complex world of clinical practice. 

As examples, radiologists are being dinged for total x-ray exposure while surgeons are being held accountable for pre-op antibiotic administration. While these and other quality measures are important, they fall far short of recognizing what keeps docs up at night, like reading the x-ray correctly and getting a patient through surgery and out of the hospital.

"Hear hear!" says the Disease Management Care Blog.  In the course of a normal day, it is job of doctors to do "doctor stuff" involving one patient at a time. 

But, you ask, isn't that contrary to being accountable to the health of populations? 

The DMCB doesn't think so, because state-of-the-art population health management (PHM) agrees that:

A. Physicians need to be immunized from disruptions their "customer facing" (i.e., the patient) activities.  Otherwise known as the doctor-patient relationship, that's the part of the health care system that relies on the seven or more years of undergraduate and graduate training that turns smart people into exquisitely trained physicians.  Let the doctors be doctors, says the DMCB, and let them worry about their patients.

B. High performing systems - as much as possible - need to be configured around those customer-facing activities, further enabling the doc to focus on the patient who is right here and right now. 

From time to time, PHM might have to intrude.  When it does, the DMCB suggests policymakers recognize that they should proceed:

1) only when it's really important

2) only infrequently and

3) whenever possible, when it reduces physician work by outsourcing (an example in primary care can be found here) those things that don't require the personal involvement of a doc.

It would seem that Medicare's PQRS failed to recognize the fundamentals.

Image fromWikipedia

How Can Care Management Programs Manage Physician Incentives?

One ingredient for physician cooperation?
Years ago, when the Disease Management Care Blog was helping to lead a care management program, it was paired up with a nurse-administrator who was troubled by the notion that docs should get paid to sign-off on a disease management care plan. Why, it was asked, should docs get any extra compensation to do something that's a fundamental part of caring for patients?

It listened politely to its colleague's input.  After a careful review of all the issues, risks, benefits and alternatives, the physician-DMCB decided to compromise by paying the docs to sign-off on the care plans.

Drs. Nikola Biller-Andorno and Thomas H. Lee, writing in the March 14 New England Journal, point out that that physician enticements are far more complicated than shekels for signatures. They think economic incentives in health care are a complex mix of "traditional," (social status) "self-interest, (one example is money) "affective" (being appreciated) and "shared purpose" (for the greater good) motives.  They also suggest that they are unavoidable.

A nurse care management administrator might as well join 'em rather than fight 'em.

Armed with that insight, it's easier to contrast the underlying cultures of a non-for-profit community health center versus a for-profit hospital chain. It's also easier to understand that performance measures can not only appeal to self-interest (as in pay for performance) but to the "affective" reward of being given an excellent rating by a community of colleagues.  The authors also point out that a sense of shared purpose cannot be underestimated, since it speaks to the "core principles of the medical profession."

The DMCB's insight here is that there is no single incentive "lever" that can change physician behavior.  Rather, the best approach to incentives is to capitalize on all four incentive domains.  What's more, if "shared purpose" is undervalued, physicians are more likely to feel dissed and ignore the best laid incentive plan.

It turns out paying the docs was the right thing to do as well as appealing to their sense of shared purpose.  What the DMCB and nurse administrator should have done was to also look for some way to leverage the other domains of social status (perhaps a recognition program) and being appreciated (asking a lead physician to express appreciation for the extra work.

Image from Wikipedia
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